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Talking Past Each Other? 
Cultural Framing of Skeptical and Convinced Logics in the Climate Change Debate 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the extent to which two institutional logics around climate change – 
the climate change “convinced” and climate change “skeptical” logics – are truly 
competing or talking past each other in a way that can be described as a logic schism.  
Drawing on the concept of framing from social movement theory, it uses qualitative field 
observations from the largest climate deniers conference in the U.S. and a dataset of 
almost 800 op/eds from major news outlets over a two-year period to examine how 
convinced and skeptical arguments of opposing logics employ frames and issue 
categories to make arguments about climate change.  This paper finds that the two logics 
are engaging in different debates on similar issues with the former focusing on solutions 
while the latter debates the definition of the problem. It concludes that the debate appears 
to be reaching a level of polarization where one might begin to question whether 
meaningful dialogue and problem solving has become unavailable to participants. The 
implications of such a logic schism is a shift from an integrative debate focused on 
addressing interests to a distributive battle over concessionary agreements with each side 
pursuing its goals by demonizing the other. Avoiding such an outcome requires the 
activation of, as yet, dormant “broker” frames (technology, religion and national 
security), the redefinition of existing ones (science, economics, risk, ideology) and the 
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In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that 
“the balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from 
changes in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, 
suggests a discernible human influence on global climate” (Bolin et al, 1995).  That 
announcement reflected a larger fact that academic scholars in the physical sciences had 
come to almost universally accept the belief that human activity was a major cause of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that these emissions were influencing changes in 
the global climate.1 Oreskes’ (2004) survey of scientific journals confirms this claim, 
finding that no research papers published between 1993 and 2003 in the peer-reviewed 
literature disagreed with the consensus view of the IPCC.   
In the face of such scientific support, most social scientists also adopted the idea 
that anthropogenic climate change was real. While attention to climate change in the 
social and managerial sciences was slower to develop than in the physical sciences 
(Goodall, 2008), recent attention to the issue by business and social science researchers 
has largely neglected debates over the reality of climate change and focused almost 
exclusively on an assessment of strategy options available to individuals and 
organizations as solutions to address the issue.  Many policy-makers, businesses, non-
governmental organizations and the general public shared this acceptance of climate 
change science as well. A nationally representative sample of the U.S. citizenry showed 
that 71 percent of U.S. citizens said they believed in the science of climate change at the 
beginning of 2008 (Pew Research Center 2009). 
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In short, all of these communities had overwhelmingly adopted the view that 
anthropogenic climate change was a problem and treat this view as a dominant 
institutional logic. As “the belief systems that furnish guide-lines for practical action” 
(Rao, Monin and Durand. 2003: 795), institutional logics are a critical starting point for 
understanding the underlying beliefs (Scott, 2001) shaping the climate change debate. 
However, as Friedland and Alford (1991) explicitly note, institutions inherently contain 
contradictions and multiple logics are often available to individuals and organizations as 
they operate within them. This means that along with the dominant logic that climate 
change is a serious problem warranting action, there also exists a challenger logic 
(McAdam and Scott 2005) that asserts that climate change is not a problem at all.   
Unfortunately, much of our social science research either takes a relatively 
dismissive attitude toward those who challenge the scientific view that climate change is 
real – dubbed “climate skeptics” or “climate deniers”2 – or subscribes to them sinister 
motives and neglects their beliefs altogether (see McCright and Dunlap (2000) and (2003) 
for exceptions). This nearly complete neglect and/or dismissal of a challenger climate 
logic, however, has proven to be a significant oversight on the part of social science 
researchers in the organizational and policy fields.  Within the last three years, the logic 
that climate change is a problem has faced renewed challenge. As a result, scholars, 
politicians, activists and business representatives adhering to the dominant logic have 
recently experienced something akin to “climate whiplash” around the issue. 
The shift in the debate began in the fall of 2009 with a series of events that 
galvanized the climate denier movement and created confusion within the general public. 
First, the integrity of the scientific community was called into question in November 
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2009 when a long series of emails among climate scientists at the University of East 
Anglia were released. Dubbed “climategate” by the media, climate deniers claimed the 
emails proved that prominent climate scientists had manipulated and withheld data that 
disproved the severity of climate change. Subsequent investigations cleared the scientists 
of wrongdoing (Adam, 2010), although these investigations also called for more 
transparent communication among climate scientists about data. Additionally, the IPCC 
publicly apologized in January 2010 for inaccurate claims in the Working Group II 
document of the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report that the Himalayan glaciers 
would likely melt by 2035 (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden and Hanson, 2007).  
In the same month, IPCC chair Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri was accused by a British 
newspaper of having a financial conflict of interest in his role as chair and personally 
profiting from climate change science. 
Prominent climate deniers quickly adopted these events as a basis for challenging 
the notion that climate change is a legitimate problem. Coincident with this denier 
attention was a sharp drop in public acceptance of the reality of climate change. In 2009, 
a nationally representative survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (2009) showed 
that belief in the science of climate change declined from 71 to 57 percent among 
Americans between April 2008 and October 2009. While the Pew Center suggested that 
the decline may have been due to the severe economic recession that the U.S. was 
experiencing (Derbyshire, 2009), the impact of these events on the public discourse 
around climate change has made it clear that the problem is not a broadly accepted 
institutional logic and that more than scientific data and analysis are at play in shaping 
the debate over climate change.  
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This paper seeks to expand our understanding of the climate debate by examining 
it through the lens of cultural and institutional theories (Bazerman and Hoffman, 1999; 
Scott, 2001; Hulme, 2009; Hoffman, 2010).   While largely exploratory in nature, it 
provides a preliminary descriptive analysis of the cultural and social landscape of the 
climate debate in the United States.  Its goal is to examine the presence of ideological and 
cultural influences on both the definition of the problem and consideration of solutions. 
As a cultural issue, climate change engages embedded values around issue categories 
related to religion, economics, risk, freedom, national security and others (Hulme, 2009).  
We are, in fact, in what Kuhn (1970) refers to as “revolutionary science,” a period of 
crisis when an anomalous event or issue challenges the dominant order. As social 
scientists, our role is to pursue explanations for these challenges and my hope it to spur 
more social science research on the conflict over climate change at the individual and 
organizational levels of analysis.   
Surprisingly, we do not yet have a framework to talk about the climate debate in 
the social realm.  Drawing on my own training in organizational theory, I rely on social 
movement theory on framing (Benford and Snow, 2000) and the concept of institutional 
logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) to examine the debate 
over climate change. I treat the issue as a contested terrain in which competing 
movements engage in discursive debates – or framing battles – over the interpretation of 
the problem and the necessity and nature of solutions.  These movements possess 
competing institutional logics regarding climate change – what I am calling the “climate 
change convinced” and “climate change skeptical” logics (For the remainder of the paper, 
these groups will be referred to as simply “convinced” and “skeptical”) – which are 
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communicated through a variety of issue categories (e.g. science, risk, political ideology 
and others) and cultural frames (e.g. diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) (Benford 
and Snow, 2000).  
In this analysis, I am careful to distinguish between the organized “climate denier” 
movement and the broader “skeptical” population. Whereas the organized denier 
movement is a collective social movement run by professional advocacy organizations 
working to discredit climate change like the Heartland Institute and conservative think 
tanks like the Cato Institute that produce research and white papers, the “skeptical” label 
is ascribed to a population who are doubtful about climate change or the motivations 
behind calls for climate action in the broader population. Figure 1 shows a stylized 
depiction of these populations based on opinion polling data from the Pew Research 
Center (2009). Climate change deniers and believers occupy the extreme positions in the 
debate, employing a logic that is fairly closed to debate or engagement.  The convinced 
and skeptical populations occupy a more central position in the debate, actively asking 
questions and debating the issues.  A fifth group of those that are disengaged on climate 
change might also be found in a position between these two groups (Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, and Roser-Renouf, 2008). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
To explore how competing logics are presented within the debate over climate 
change, I examine the issue categories and cultural frames employed by both convinced 
and skeptical authors in U.S. newspaper editorials between 2007 and 2009. A critical 
question is whether these competing movements are engaged in common debate or 
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whether they are “talking past each other” in what amounts to a “logic schism.”  I also 
seek to uncover which categories and frames from the climate denier movement resonate 
within the skeptical population by drawing on qualitative field research collected at the 
largest climate denier conference in the U.S. and recent work on the denier movement by 
others (McCright and Dunlap, 2000, 2003; Oreskes and Conway, 2010).  
 
Literature Review 
Like all environmental issues, the issue of climate change is institutionally and 
culturally rooted (Bazerman and Hoffman, 1999; Hulme, 2009; Hoffman, 2010). While 
technological and economic activity may be the direct cause of GHG emissions, cultural 
norms and societal institutions guide the development of that activity (Bazerman and 
Hoffman, 1999) in a broad scope of institutional domains: scientific, political, social, and 
economic (Rosa and Dietz, 1998).  But one central aspect of institutions is their resistance 
to change. In fact, inertia is a primary defining characteristic of institutions (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, DiMaggio, 1995).  This inertia may be due 
to the strength of the taken-for-grantedness of institutional beliefs.  Organizations and 
individuals abide by them often without conscious thought (Zucker, 1983) as they form a 
culturally supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy that becomes 
unquestioned. But at times, institutional inertia is politically inflected and organizations 
and individuals mount concerted efforts to promote or resist change based on the ways in 
which their interests are affected (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005).  
Recent and successful efforts by organizational researchers to move beyond 
institutional isomorphism and stability to explore the dynamics of such activities 
Page 8 
 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Creed, Scully, and Austin 
2002) have led to an incorporation of social movement theories of mobilization and 
contestation to remedy the stability and inertia biases in the institutional literature (Rao, 
Morrill, and Zald, 2002; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Davis, McAdam, Scott, and Zald, 
2005; Rao and Giorgi, 2006; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008). Following this 
research direction, this paper combines organizational theories of logics with social 
movement theories of framing to understand societal conflict over the meaning of climate 
change and the action it requires. 
 
Social Movements and Field Level Debates 
Recent discussions in institutional theory have examined the extent to which 
agents form political networks and coalitions act as “important motors of institution-
building, deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization in organizational fields” (Rao, 
Monin and Durand, 2003: 796). This conception provides a bridge between institutional 
theory and social movement theory (Davis, McAdam, Scott and Zald, 2005), focusing 
attention on the ability of social movements to give rise to new organizational fields and 
change the demography of existing organizational fields (Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2002).  
In this contest, social movement organizations with similar preferences for change 
constitute a social movement industry, a unit of analysis not unlike the organizational 
field. Change agents become part of these collective movements, using shared and 
accumulated resources and power to “overcome historical inertia, undermine the 
entrenched power structures in the field or triumph over alternative projects of change” 
(Guillen, 2006: 43). These actions are often conducted in opposition to others in similarly 
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configured collective movements (Zald and Useem, 1987; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). 
Thus, social debates on contested issues are often dominated by polarized groups seeking 
to alter the dominant logics that permeate the broader debate within multiple 
constituencies, most notably within the policy realm. 
On the issue of climate change, social movement actors have actively mobilized 
to influence the form and direction of the broader debate.  In the climate “denier” 
movement, there are groups like the Heartland Institute, Cato Institute, Hoover Institute, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others.  In the climate “believer” movement, there 
are groups like the IPCC, the National Academies of Science, the Center for American 
Progress, the Environmental Defense Fund, and others. The engagement between the 
opposing movements has had notable influence within specific constituencies that lie 
between them, within the general public and the social debate over the problems and 
solutions to climate change.   
Consider, for example, the demographic dynamics of the recent shift in beliefs 
about climate change within the American public.  The largest shifts in beliefs from 2008 
to 2010 occurred at the extremes of the debate. The percentage of respondents claiming 
to be alarmed by climate change dropped from 18 to 10 percent and those in the 
dismissive category increased from 7 to 16 percent (Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-
Renouf 2010). These extreme positions are where one might expect members of the most 
engaged citizens to reside and can provide views of the contested nature of the debate. 
But while such surveys provide invaluable snapshots regarding where particular parts of 
public opinion stands on climate, they do not explain why these shifts occur or how they 
might weaken or strengthen climate resistance away from the extremes and more towards 
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the broader social and policy realms. Studying the logics, categories and frames that are 
employed within the climate conflict presently occurring is one way to gain traction in 
this effort (see Norgaard, 2006 as an example).   
 
Institutional Logics, Frames and Issue Categories 
Logics can be observed at the level of “organizations, markets, industries, inter-
organizational networks, geographic communities and organizational field” (Nigam and 
Ocasio, 2010: 825) and there are frequently competing logics battling for dominance 
within any given level (McAdam and Scott, 2005). Logics “define the norms, values and 
beliefs that structure the cognition of actors in organizations and provide a collective 
understanding of how strategic interests and decisions are formulated” (Thornton, 2002: 
82) and describe the practices and beliefs embedded within institutions and populations 
within them.  As such, they provide the “organizing principles for institutionalized 
practices in social systems” (Nigam and Ocasio 2010: 823).  So, for example, the 
institutional logic of capitalism is the “accumulation and the commodification of human 
activity. That of the state is rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal 
and bureaucratic hierarchies (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248).  These are the "axial 
principles of organization and action based on cultural discourses and strategic practices 
prevalent in different institutional or societal sectors" (Thornton 2004: 210). 
On the issue of climate change, we are in a period of flux in which an 
understanding of the issue and its possible solutions has not yet been fully resolved, 
despite perspectives within the academy that it has.  As a challenge to the existing 
scientific and political order has emerged, conflicts and tension between competing logics 
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are brought to the surface through framing debates and discursive contests.   The domain 
in which these challenges are resolved can be described as an institutional “field of 
struggles” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) where convinced and skeptical logics are 
presented and promoted for dominance in describing the emergent and accepted 
conception of reality.  
The skeptical logic has been described as relatively hierarchical and 
individualistic in nature.  Consistent with a capitalist market logic, those who employ this 
logic will be skeptical of environmental risks as such beliefs would justify restricting 
commerce and individual freedom. Conversely, the convinced logic has been described 
as being more egalitarian and communitarian in nature. Those who employ this logic will 
be inclined to accept environmental risks because they resent unrestrained commerce and 
self-interested behavior and readily accept that such activities are dangerous and worthy 
of regulation (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman, 2010; Rayner, 1992; Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982).  In the field of struggles that exists between these competing logics, 
those embracing the dominant logic set the rules of the game, and challengers seek to 
change those rules by replacing dominant principles and actions with logics of their own. 
The outcomes of such contests have wide ranging implications for society and social 
structure, often creating new policy domains and new market segments (Weber, Heinze 
and DeSoucey, 2008). 
Tightly linked to logics is the concept of cultural frames and framing processes. 
While “both refer to ideas and belief systems and recognize the role they play in 
providing direction, motivation, meaning and coherence” (McAdam and Scott, 2005: 16), 
logics refer to the power of dominant ideologies and shared worldviews and frames are 
Page 12 
 
used to present and articulate those worldviews. Where institutional ideologies can be 
thought of as the core beliefs that drive a movement, framing is the strategies of 
promoting a particular logic and in particular, frames become particularly salient with 
groups that seek to challenge the dominant logics (McAdam and Scott, 2005).  Cultural 
frames are critical for mobilizing a movement and they lend structure and organization to 
a set of specific practices (Swidler, 1986; Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey, 2008).   
In this paper, I focus on three types of collective action frames that social 
movement organizations typically employ: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Diagnostic frames define problems and focus blame or 
responsibility, whereas prognostic frames suggest what is to be done about them and 
motivational frames tell participants why they should act (Benford and Snow, 2000).  
These frames are not independent but interconnected.  For example, the identification and 
definition of particular problems within the diagnostic frames can “constrain the range of 
possible reasonable solutions and strategies advocated” within prognostic frames 
(Benford and Snow, 2000: 616).  Motivational frames also provide the rationale for 
diagnostic and prognostic frames and may include vocabularies of severity, urgency, 
efficacy and propriety (Benford, 1993). 
The third and final concept in this paper is that of the issue category.  These are 
the empirical topics or subjects underpin the logics, and form the center around which 
logics and frames are employed. Hulme (2009) has presented seven such categories, 
which will form the initial structure for this paper.  These include: science, economics, 




A Logic Schism 
By analyzing the frames and categories used by proponents of the convinced and 
skeptical logics, this paper seeks to take a first step in uncovering whether these 
competing logics represent a schism that cannot be resolved.   Such schisms arise due to 
linguistic and value differences that lead to positions that are relatively exclusive, rigid, 
inelastic and restricted. Boundaries become established which define clear in-group and 
out-group distinctions (Gamson, 1992).  
Pielke (2007) describes the extreme of such schisms as “abortion politics,” where 
the two sides are debating completely different issues and “no amount of scientific 
information…can reconcile the different values” (Pielke 2007: 42). In such circumstances, 
two sides are not so much competing as they are talking past one another.  For example, 
whereas those opposing abortion frame it as an issue of “life,” those in favor of allowing 
abortion frame it as an issue of a woman’s “choice.” These presentations of the issue 
illustrate how each movement is defined by different logics and uses different types of 
frames to explain them.  These competing and inconsistent frames are reflective of 
broader logics around religion and family and others. In the end, the rigidity of either side 
of the debate closes down avenues of examination such that resolution of the issue 
becomes intractable.   
In a logic schism, a contest emerges in which opposing sides are debating 
different issues, seeking only information that supports their position and disconfirms 
their opponents’ arguments (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Each side views the other 
with suspicion, even demonizing the other, leading to a strong resistance to any form of 




Methods and Data 
To analyze the current debate over climate change, data was collected from two 
separate sources.  
The first source of data comes from qualitative research using interviews, texts 
and observations at the largest annual climate denier conference in the world – the Fourth 
International Conference on Climate Change – in May 2010. This two-day conference is 
hosted by the Heartland Institute, an organization that lists “building social movements” 
as one of its stated goals. The organization’s mission is to “discover, develop, and 
promote free-market solutions to social and economic problems,” and its target audience 
is the “the nation’s 8,300 state and national elected officials and approximately 8,400 
local government officials” (http://www.heartland.org/about/mission.html).  
The author’s sociology graduate student research assistant with advanced training 
in qualitative research methods was invited to the conference by a long-time climate 
denier insider who agreed to attend all of the sessions and facilitate informal interviews 
with conference attendees. The research assistant attended the conference, recorded 
quotes from conference presentations (also available online at 
http://www.heartland.org/events/2010Chicago/proceedings.html), and conducted 
informal interviews with conference participants. During these interactions, the research 
assistant was able to inquire about individuals’ motivations for attending the conference, 
their organizational affiliations to government or private sector groups, and their climate 
beliefs. The research assistant relied on the climate denier informant who was also 
present during these interactions to test and clarify observations against the informants’ 
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understanding of the presentations. Detailed fieldnotes from the conference were 
recorded after each conference day ended. These source materials – along with work on 
the organized climate denier movement (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Dunlap and 
McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2010) – provide some initial data on the 
predominant frames within the formal climate denier movement for making preliminary 
observations about which of the denier movement’s frames resonate with the skeptical 
logic in the broader public.  
The second source of data comes from an analysis of all U.S. newspaper editorials 
in the Lexis-Nexis database from September 2007 to September 2009 that included the 
keywords “climate change” or “global warming.” This search criterion yielded 885 
editorials and letters to the editor. After removing duplicates and non-relevant articles, 
the final dataset includes 795 articles, which were used to capture the institutional logics 
and frames within the broader climate debate.  
I chose the time period from 2007 to 2009 because of the major shift in climate 
opinion among the American public that occurred from April 2008 to October 2009 (Pew 
Research Center 2009). I decided to focus on climate logics used in newspaper editorials 
rather than other document sources for several reasons. First, unlike peer-reviewed 
publications or think tank articles that often attempt to frame their arguments in objective 
and/or scientific terms, editorials express explicit opinions on climate change, making it 
easier to identify frames and categories, and classify them as reflecting skeptical or 
convinced logics. Additionally, I wanted to analyze climate framing in publications that 
are likely to reach large numbers of lay citizens and become topics of “water cooler” 
conversation rather than technical reports from think tanks on either side of the climate 
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debate. Finally, editorials provide an appropriate data sample to evaluate climate logics 
among the media and broader public rather than debates among “policy or scientific 
elites.” I am cognizant that using newspaper editorial data creates a selection bias for 
citizens and journalists who have strong opinions regarding climate change and neglects 
those who are apathetic, unsure, cautious or disengaged about the issue.  According to 
Yale’s America’s study of climate beliefs among U.S. citizens, the disengaged numbered 
over 30 percent of Americans in 2008 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf, 2008). 
However, for the purposes of this study, the relevant frames come from individuals who 
have adopted one logic of climate change or the other. They are the ones battling one 
another, and both sides work hard to convince the cautious and disengaged in the middle 
that they are correct.  
The newspaper data were coded using a coding key developed based on Hulme’s 
(2009) seven “lenses” to view the climate change debate. Using Hulme’s work as a guide, 
an initial code key of seven issue categories was created in which the convinced and 
skeptical authors were likely to invoke particular frames and categories in their editorial 
writings. The initial key was tested using sub-samples of articles, and through multiple 
rounds of coding and revising the key with the author and research assistants, a 
comprehensive code key was created that includes frames in the following issue 
categories: science, risk, technology, economics, religion, political ideology, and national 
security.  
Within each of the seven issue categories, convinced and skeptical arguments 
were further coded as diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames (Benford and Snow, 
2000). For example, statements like, “This is not made-up science, and the most recent 
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studies suggest that the consequences of global warming are occurring faster than 
previously projected” (Article no. 394) were coded as diagnostic frames under the 
science category for the convinced logic. For skeptical arguments, statements such as, 
“Like it or not, the scientific theory that humans are causing the Earth to warm is still in 
the ‘not sure’ camp” (Article no. 399) were coded as diagnostic science frames. See 
Appendix 1 for the full coding key.   
The newspaper editorials were coded by two Sociology doctoral students with 
advanced training in qualitative methods. The coders applied global and specific codes to 
each article using HyperRESEARCH 2.8. First, they coded each article overall as 
convinced, skeptical, neutral, or unclear. Next, they coded each article sentence by 
sentence using the code key outlined above. If sentences expressed multiple frames in 
different issue categories, each frame was coded. Frames were also coded multiple times 
if they were used more than once in a given article. After coding several sub-samples of 
the data to discuss discrepancies and refine the code key, the coders’ inter-rater reliability 
in all but two of the issue categories was .60 or higher (Cohen’s Kappa). In the two 
categories where reliability was lower, the coders discussed their coding differences until 
agreement could be reached. The articles were also coded for date, newspaper source, 
newspaper location, author credentials, article length, and whether the article was a letter 
to the editor.  
 
Findings 
Climate Denier Conference Observations 
The Heartland Institute conference included presentations by more than seventy 
climate denier presenters (and two climate believer speakers) over a two-day period with 
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an estimated audience of around 700 conference attendees. The theme of the conference 
was “Reconsidering the Science and Economics” and was co-sponsored by almost 120 
nonprofit institutions, including among others: Americans for Tax Reform, Ayn Rand 
Institute, Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, George C. Marshall Institute, 
Hayek Institut, John Locke Foundation, New Zealand Climate Science Coalition, Science 
and Public Policy Institute, and the Tennessee Center for Policy Research.  
The presentations consisted of small panel discussions as well as full conference 
plenary speeches. Many of the speakers used loud, forceful tones during their 
presentations to express their view that climate change is not a problem, and many also 
expressed optimism at the recent increase in public skepticism around climate change, the 
climategate scandal and the IPCC retractions.   
The self-proclaimed climate denier who sponsored the attendance at the 
conference emphasized that climate deniers in the movement are not monolithic in their 
views. He noted, for example, that deniers have diverse opinions regarding nuclear 
energy and energy security, and some are driven more by libertarian ideologies while 
others connect climate change to social issues. Despite these differences within the 
movement, the majority of presenters invoked three primary issue categories during the 
conference – science, ideology, and economics – and a predominant emphasis on a 
addressing the nature of the problem through a diagnostic frame.  
Science. Beyond the actual scientific data of climate change, deniers at the 
Heartland conference focused on what they consider a corrupt and deeply flawed peer 
review process in the scientific academic community. In the denier view, peer review is 
not based on the merit of the research being produced but by the political and social 
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biases of scientists in editorial positions at academic journals (McCormick, 2009; 
Schrader-Freschette, 1997). One speaker expressed this view most succinctly in his 
luncheon address when he said “The problem of science goes back to World War 
II…they moved the peer review process to the pal review process.”  
Ideology. The deniers also asserted that science editors only publish work that 
conforms to their own political beliefs. For many climate deniers, there is a belief that 
climate change is inextricably tied to a liberal political ideology that borders on socialism 
or communism. During conference presentations and in conversations with attendees, 
individuals who believe in the science of climate change were referred to as all of the 
following: Warmists, Alarmists, AGW (Anthropocentric Global Warming) people, 
Lefties, Communists, and Obama-ites.  
One presenter said that climate believers “hate people, they hate the Western 
economy.” Another went further to suggest, “He who controls carbon controls life,” and 
told the audience that Americans might end up with carbon rationing cards for every 
person if climate believers succeed. This speaker also called a Thomas Friedman New 
York Times editorial about the ability of China to do more on climate change faster than 
the U.S. a call for totalitarianism in the US. Many presenters framed climate change as a 
tool for a stronger role for government in the personal lives of Americans and a severe 
restriction on their freedoms.  For example, a prominent climate denier scientist who was 
running for the U.S. House of Representatives expressed this view in a campaign video 
shown at the conference. He said, “All of our industries have been hampered by 
government regulation…climate change is just another attempt to diminish our freedom.” 
Another speaker made links to the environmental movement and ideology by saying, 
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“The environmental agenda seeks to use the state to create scarcity as a means to exert 
their will, and the state’s authority, over your lives.”  
Economics. Deniers also invoked the concern that addressing climate change will 
have severe and negative economic consequences for the United States. Deniers suggest 
that inaction on climate will provide economic advantages to the United States. 
According to one well-know climate denier, “Doing nothing about climate change is 
doing something. It enables people to keep their money and invest it in the future.” 
Deniers are also critical of climate action proponents push for “green jobs,” with one 
speaker suggesting that it is just another "ideological push for a Euro-style [economic] 
disaster.” In a panel on the economic impacts of climate and energy policies, one speaker 
argued that even seemingly market-based policies to address climate change like cap and 
trade are just a way for big business to rent-seek. He used Exelon as an example of a 
utility that has a lot of nuclear so supports all climate legislation, because they will be in a 
favorable position to sell credits. 
Overall, the field observations at the Heartland Institute Conference show a denier 
emphasis on three issue categories (science, ideology and economics) and a diagnostic 
frame.  The presentation of this emphasis aligns closely to the observations of others who 
have studied the climate denier movement (i.e. Oreskes and Conway, 2010, Dunlap and 
McCright, 2010) and find it possesses a deep suspicion of environmentalists, perceiving 
them to be a threat to freedom, capitalism and democracy.  For many in the climate 
denier movement, climate change is part of a larger culture war against liberal social 
and/or economic views as well as an environmental agenda that is viewed as a threat to 





Descriptive data.  The overall position on climate change within the newspaper 
article data mirrors national public opinion data for 2008 (see table 1). Seventy-three 
percent of articles (N=578) were convinced and 20 percent were skeptical (N=155), in 
line with Pew Research Center findings that 71 percent of Americans believed there is 
solid evidence that the Earth is warming in 2008, and 21 percent did not believe while 8 
percent were unsure (Pew Research Center, 2009).3 Given this disparity in the convinced 
and skeptical sample sizes, I do not compare the raw numbers of frames and categories 
used by each side, but rather the percentage of articles under each logic. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Convinced articles were found to be more likely presented through op/eds while 
the skeptical articles were presented more commonly through letters to the editor (see 
table 2). Just over 25 percent of convinced articles were letters to the editor, whereas 
almost 60 percent of skeptical articles were letters to the editor (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Whereas journalists wrote over 46 percent of convinced articles, they only 
authored 32 percent of skeptical articles as shown in Table 3 (chi-square  p ≤ 0.01). As a 
comparison, citizens authored over 55 percent of skeptical articles compared to 21 
percent of convinced articles (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001).4 Notably low in the authorship of all 
of the climate change articles (convinced and skeptical) are scientists, academics and 
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policy officials. Presumably these experts write about climate change in venues other 
than newspaper editorials, but the degree to which their messages regularly reach lay 
audiences is unclear.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Issue categories.  This analysis of the skeptical and convinced logics began by 
looking at the issue categories that are employed in the debate over climate change. 
Shown in table 4, each logic has dominant, secondary and latent categories of interest that 
are similar and different in several ways. Most prominently, they share a dominant 
category of political ideology. 
For the convinced, the dominant categories (more than 50 percent of the articles 
reference it) are risk (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) and political ideology (chi-square  p ≤ 0.05). 
The secondary categories of concern (more than 20 percent of articles mention it) are 
science (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) and religion (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001). The latent or dormant 
category (less than 20 percent of articles mention it) is national security (chi-square  p ≤ 
0.001). For the skeptical, the dominant categories are science (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) and 
political ideology (chi-square  p ≤ 0.05), and the secondary issue category is risk (chi-
square  p ≤ 0.001). Religion (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) and national security (chi-square  p ≤ 
0.001) are latent or dormant. Results for economics and technology were not significant. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Not surprisingly, almost 90 percent of skeptical articles reference science. It 
suggests that the skeptical logic centers on the idea that the problem definition of climate 
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change is the crux of the debate. For the skeptical, there is no problem or there is 
uncertainty about whether there is a problem. This bears some resemblance to the 
qualitative field analysis of the climate denier movement, whose primary issue categories 
were science, ideology and economics, suggesting at least some overlap exists between 
the categories of the formal social movement and those of the broader skeptical logic.  
For both skeptical and convinced logics, national security is a latent or dormant issue 
categories, suggesting either this debate domain that has been rejected or not yet 
addressed. 
Frames. Looking more deeply at the frames that are presented within each logic, 
table 5 shows that within both the skeptical and convinced logics, all three types of 
frames are used (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational), although each has one 
dominant frame and two secondary foci.  Results for both the diagnostic and prognostic 
frames are statistically significant (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) while the motivational frame is 
not. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Skeptical authors were fairly singular in their framing of the issue, with 
almost 95 percent of articles using diagnostic frames to call into question the 
problematization of climate change. The majority of this questioning centered on the 
science behind climate change, as illustrated by this skeptical newspaper quote:  
“Did you know that global temperatures have been falling, not rising, for the 
past decade - despite the IPCC's predictions of a steady rise? Have you ever 
heard the maxim, ‘If the facts contradict the theory, find a new theory’ - a 
maxim now being ignored by our leaders?” (Article no. 84). 
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Conversely, the types of frames invoked for convinced arguments, while 
predominately prognostic, are more evenly distributed. Diagnostic and motivational 
frames are both used in over half of the convinced articles. From this observation, there 
appears to be more frame heterogeneity in the convinced versus frame homogeneity in 
the skeptical logic. 
Linkages between frames and issue categories. While the skeptical logic 
broadly addresses climate change as an issue of science and political ideology (table 4) 
and uses a diagnostic frame (table 5) and the convinced logic addresses climate change as 
an issue of risk and political ideology (table 4) and uses a prognostic frame (table 5), the 
more detailed findings shown in table 6 reveal important differences in the fine grained 
form of the debate.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
First, almost 60 percent of all skeptical articles in the political ideology category 
use a diagnostic frame (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) to suggest that the science of climate 
change is politically motivated. Similar to the terminology of the climate denier 
movement, nearly 25 percent of all skeptical articles refer to climate change proponents 
as “alarmists.”  More specifically, the dominant political target of these arguments is Al 
Gore, who is blamed by skeptical authors for fabricating the problem of climate change 
for ideological and personal gain.  A word count of all of the skeptical articles showed 
that nearly 40 percent of them mention Gore in one fashion or another.  The following 




“Al Gore wanders the spheroid he is determined to save, spouting 
increasingly inane observations as his bank account grows and his ‘carbon 
footprint’ becomes ever more Godzilla-like, considering all the jet fuel 
burned as he hurtles from appearance to appearance. I have read that his 
speaking fee is now $175,000 a pop, a fee for which his audiences are fed 
what seems to me to be an amazing concoction of lies, distortions and flights 
of fancy.” (Article no. 62). 
As a contrast, convinced articles invoke prognostic frames under the political 
ideology category more often than diagnostic frames (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001), placing 
emphasis on what type of federal climate legislation should be passed. Even when 
convinced authors do not like the form that climate legislation or climate action may take 
politically, they are generally supportive of doing something about it through legislation 
or regulation. This convinced author, for example, suggests it any vote for cap and trade 
is better than nothing:  
“There is much in the House cap-and-trade energy bill that just passed that I 
absolutely hate. It is too weak in key areas and way too complicated in others. 
A simple, straightforward carbon tax would have made much more sense than 
this Rube Goldberg contraption. It is pathetic that we couldn't do better. It is 
appalling that so much had to be given away to polluters. It stinks. It's a mess. 
I detest it. Now let's get it passed in the Senate and make it law.” (Article no. 
72)  
It is also interesting to note that, although skeptical articles focus less on 
prognostic actions for climate change under political ideology than convinced authors 
(due to their opposition to climate legislation), over 20 percent of skeptical ideology 
articles include prognostic frames (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001). These articles generally suggest 
legislation (carbon tax or cap and trade) should not be passed. The vast majority of the 
skeptical ideology prognostic frames focus on the argument that fast-growing developing 
countries like China, India, and Brazil have to commit to GHG reductions before the 
United States should take any action. 
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Perhaps the most interesting difference between the two logics manifests itself in 
the risk issue category. Shown in table 6, the convinced risk articles use mostly 
diagnostic and prognostic frames (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001) that emphasize the physical, 
social, and health risks from climate change, as well as the urgency to act.  For the 
convinced, the concern seems to be both convincing readers that climate change is a risk 
(diagnostic) and something we must address with action now (prognostic). Slightly more 
of the total diagnostic frames used by convinced authors are about risk as opposed to 
science. This suggests that the convinced are shifting away from defining climate change 
as a problem of science and moving toward defining it as an issue of risk. For example, 
the quote below is illustrative of a convinced risk diagnostic frame that argues that 
climate change will increase the risk of severe and complex weather disruptions. 
“Global warming does not imply that it will be 50 degrees in the winter in 
Michigan. What it does mean is that the depletion of the ozone layer and 
subsequent warming of the earth's oceans and crust will lead to continually 
worsening weather phenomena when typically cold arctic air masses meet the 
now warmer air masses coming from the oceans. Consequently, 
thunderstorms, rainfall, snowfall, tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis and 
temperature fluctuations to the lower or higher will in fact be much more 
frequent as well as severe. Climate change is a complex combination of 
factors that results in a myriad of weather aberrations.” (Article no. 243). 
The convinced authors do not stop at defining climate change as a risk, however. 
They also express actions they believe must be taken to address the issues. The following 
convinced risk prognostic article expresses this sentiment: 
“The problem, when it comes to motivating politicians, is that the dangers 
from global warming - drought, famine, rising seas - appear to be decades off. 
But the only way to prevent them is with sacrifices in the here and now: with 
smaller cars, bigger investments in new energy sources, higher electricity 




For the skeptical, the framing of risk is focused much more on motivations than 
diagnosing the problem or suggesting actions to take (chi-square  p ≤ 0.001). Although 
risk is a secondary issue category for skeptical authors, over a quarter of all such articles 
make a risk motivational argument to focus on the positive externalities that will occur 
due to climate change (e.g. longer growing seasons) or the risks to quality of life if 
climate change is addressed. For example, this skeptical risk motivational article states 
that, “Not all the effects of climate change negatively affect agriculture; growing seasons 




When one thinks about the climate change debate, it is sometimes tempting to 
first refer to the political discourse on the issue, particularly around the Waxman-Markey 
Climate Bill (HR 2454) that was approved by the US House of Representatives on June 
26, 2009 by a vote of 219 to 212.  That debate was at times vitriolic, suggesting an 
intractable divide exists over climate change in Congress. Representative Joe Barton (R-
TX) equated the Waxman-Markey Bill with regressive development.   
“…you can test drive Waxman-Markey by sailing down to Haiti, because current 
CO2 emissions are where Waxman-Markey wants America's to be in 2050. 
Radical environmentalists think such a CO2 level will be heaven on Earth, but the 
place that has actually achieved it is a nation swimming in bacterial and protozoal 
diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, typhoid fever, dengue fever and malaria, with 47 
percent illiteracy and a life expectancy of 49 years.” (Barton, 2009). 
On the opposite side of the debate, Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) equated 
climate deniers to Nazis: 
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"It reminds me in some ways of the debate taking place in this country and around 
the world in the late 1930s. During that period of Nazism and fascism's growth – 
a real danger to the United States and democratic countries around the world – 
there were people in this country and in the British parliament who said 'don't 
worry! Hitler's not real! It'll disappear!" (Montopoli, 2010). 
In the shadow of such acrimony, the goal of this paper is to uncover whether 
competing logics within the broader climate debate represent a logic schism and if so, 
whether that schism has reached such a point that it cannot be resolved.  The form of the 
political dialogue illustrated above (which may be suggestive of the denier/believer 
extreme of the debate) suggests a conflict of positions that are relatively exclusive and 
rigid, positions that will not yield to negotiation and resolution because they define and 
establish very strong in-group/out-group distinctions (Gamson, 1992).  At the national 
level at least, it appears that for some of the more extreme elements political debate has 
broken down and the two sides are talking past each other. 
Similar to the divisions in the political rhetoric, the denier movement field 
observations in this paper show an antagonistic posture toward the believer movement. 
And, it appears that some of the themes present in the denier social movement are present 
in the broader skeptical movement represented by the newspaper article data. A focus on 
the diagnostic framing of the issue is central within both domains with the issue 
categories of science, ideology, and economics dominant in the denier movement and the 
issue categories of science and ideology within the skeptical logic.   
The coding results of newspaper articles also show a division between the 
skeptical and convinced logics with the former devoting a great deal of attention to the 
diagnostic frames around whether climate change is actually happening as a man-made 
phenomena, and the latter moving to the prognostic frames of accepting the nature of the 
problem and attending to solutions. This result is suggestive that they are engaging in 
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different debates over climate. This form of division should not be unexpected as debate 
and control of this initial diagnostic frame is critically important to the identification and 
definition of the problem. Such diagnostic frames “constrain the range of possible 
reasonable solutions and strategies advocated” (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616).  If the 
skeptical position moves to the prognostic, they accept a bounded set of solutions that 
have been predetermined by the accepted form of the definition of the problem. 
The skeptical logic is predominantly built upon a diagnostic frame around the 
issue categories of science and ideology, whereas the convinced logic is predominately 
built on the prognostic frame around risk and ideology. Within the convinced logic, 
arguments span the spectrum of all three frames, suggesting continued engagement in a 
debate with the skeptical logic over the validity of the science.  But, looking more deeply 
at the linkages between frames and issue categories, particularly around ideology and risk, 
suggests a deeper logic schism than a strict focus on types of frames and issue categories 
alone can reveal.  
Clearly both logics view climate change as a political issue and engage on the 
issue by talking about political ideology, politics, and legislation. However, they do not 
frame the issue of political ideology in the same way. This is likely a reflection of the 
overall split in dominant frames between the two logics. Skeptical authors almost 
unanimously question the definition of the problem and who is to blame, using a 
diagnostic frame for political ideology to suggest that climate change is not a real 
scientific problem but rather a problem of morally questionable political figures.  
Convinced authors invoked a prognostic frame for political ideology, placing emphasis 
on what type of federal climate legislation should be passed to do something about a 
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problem that has already been defined. Where convinced articles emphasize the physical, 
social, and health risks from climate change, skeptical articles focus on the risks to 
quality of life if climate change is addressed and the positive externalities that will occur 
due to climate change (e.g. longer growing seasons).  Risk is built on two completely 
contrasting assessments of the threat at hand, one coming from inaction and the other 
from action.   
As one final note, there were two surprising results in the data.  First, it was 
surprising to find that religion was more likely to be invoked as an issue category by the 
convinced than skeptical authors. Contrary to what many believe is a skeptical movement 
driven by the Christian right (see Wardekker, Petersen and van der Sluijs, 2009; Nerlich, 
2010; Wilkinson, 2010), it was the convinced authors were more likely to invoke moral 
arguments for climate action directly, as highlighted by this quote:  
“Climate change poses a myriad of difficult challenges - scientific, political, 
economic and technological. But more important than any of that, it poses a 
moral challenge. It asks whether we are so bound to our own comfort, so 
resistant to any suggestion of slight sacrifice, that we will risk condemning 
future generations to a profoundly diminished planet.” (Article no. 735).  
Second, it was surprising to find that national security arguments were not 
invoked more often by convinced authors. One might have thought that national security 
would be another possible issue category that the convinced would use to persuade the 
undecided and skeptical that climate is a problem worth addressing. One possible 
explanation is that the national security frame is invoked more often by climate believer 
social movement actors writing white papers for think tanks and policy institutes that do 
not reach lay citizens as easily.  
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In summary, there appears to be a deepening schism between the skeptical and 
convinced logics, one that rests on foundational arguments that are based on different 
worldviews, different issues and different frames to communicate them.  Much like the 
schism that exists between the denier and believer movements, the opposing skeptical 
and convinced logics within the broader public appear to be reaching a level of 
polarization where one might begin to question whether meaningful dialogue and 
problem-solving has become unavailable to participants. Further research can provide a 
better understanding and better terminology to explain the details of this debate as well as 
examine how the debate takes form in different cultural and national contexts.  The final 




In the institutional “field of struggles” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) where 
multiple models are presented and promoted for dominance in describing the emergent 
and accepted conception of reality, it is the institutional logics that form the underlying 
and supporting tension of this contest as well as the building blocks out of which a new 
reality will be formed. But, the organizational literature on institutional logics suggests 
that when competing logics confront one another in organizational fields, both sides 
actively consider their own position in relation to those of other logics (Rao, Monin and 
Durand, 2003, Suddaby and Greenwood 2005, Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey, 2008). 
This paper has shown that these studies assume too quickly that field debates occur in 
such a streamlined fashion. The contest over climate change suggests that logics are 
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largely problematizing the issue and talking about solutions in very different ways. More 
importantly, this paper has explored a context in which competing logics have become 
polarized and oppositional to an extent that debate and engagement may have broken 
down. Under such circumstances, new studies are required to explore the dynamics by 
which this happened.  What were the critical events or actions that lead to such a situation 
and can it be reversed once it becomes set?   
Several avenues have been exposed that may be fruitful for exploring facets of 
this question.  First, there is the question of whether a logic with a single dominant frame 
type – like diagnostic frames under the skeptical logic – will be more or less successful in 
a competing logics scenario with a logic that uses more diffuse frames to express its 
worldview.  Second, the field research data raises research questions about how frames 
and categories from social movement actors (e.g. the climate denier movement) do or do 
not resonate with larger populations who would locate themselves under the skeptical 
logic. Third, this paper exposes the need to understand more clearly the ways in which 
frames from both climate deniers and climate believers become translated by the media – 
an important information channel in public debates -- and absorbed by citizens and 
politicians to understand the dynamics.  While existing research has studied the role of 
the media in framing climate science (i.e. Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff and 
Rajan, 2007), much less has been written to understand how climate denier arguments are 
presented. As the ultimate aim in this paper has been to spark more research on how 
culture affects (and is affected by) the climate change debate, more questions have been 
raised than have been answered and I hope others will follow.  
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Finally, apart from examining these aspects of competing logics within the 
climate change debate, this paper’s analysis has sought to make two other, less obvious 
contributions:  the need to attend to an overlooked constituent in social science research, 
politically conservative movements; and the importance of increased problem based 
research. 
Ignoring the politically conservative in society. Social movement theorists have 
been criticized – and have criticized themselves – for not attending enough to politically 
conservative movements, although this has begun to change (see Blee and Creasap, 2010).  
The dearth of research on climate resistance, uncertainty and apathy must change to 
understand the full landscape of the conflict. In short, it is problematic to sample on the 
dependent variable, and it is folly to only research organizations and debates among 
groups that already agree that solutions to climate change are necessary (Hoffman, 2011). 
We also need to attend to those opposed (and indifferent) to climate change action to 
understand the landscape of the debate more completely. Historians are currently doing 
this better than social scientists (Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
The call for more problem based research. This analysis has also sought to 
make a contribution toward producing problem-based research (Biggart and Lutzenhiser, 
2007; Davis and Marquis, 2005). Problem-based research draws on theoretical principles 
for problem examination, and aims for building general theory. But, it creates value by 
providing deeper and richer explanations of critical problems in our world. Research 
findings under the problem-based approach are designed to be robust observations 
(Hoffman and Jennings, 2011) that can lead to both the exploration of generic 
mechanisms that apply to problems of a similar class, and the introduction of theoretical 
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approaches to policy domain. Few contemporary issues warrant social and cultural 
analysis by problem-focused researchers more than environmental sustainability issues, 
and such analysis can aid in providing greater “rigor and relevance” in the assessment of 
our research questions (Tushman and O’Reilly, 2007). Social scientists have a duty to 
bring this type of research into the public sphere to help resolve such a pressing debate 
(Hoffman, 2011), even if our answers are not definitive. 
 
Policy Implications 
At the core of this paper is the observation that the debate about climate change is 
as much a cultural debate as it is a scientific debate. Science does not have the definitive 
final word on whether society accepts climate change as a problem worth addressing. 
Thus, the social constituency that is relevant in this debate goes beyond scientific experts 
and extends to broader members of society.  While anthropogenic climate change has 
now reached the level of a scientific consensus (National Research Council, 2010)5, it has 
not yet reached the level of a social consensus (Durkheim, [1895] 1982), one that 
emerges, not from individual responses and preferences, but from the social community 
that socializes each of its members (Farganis, 2004).  Interestingly, this analysis shows 
first that academic scientists are relatively absent from this social debate, comprising less 
than five percent of article authors.  While not a unique finding (i.e. Painter, 2010), this 
should be a cause for concern among those who seek an educated electorate on such 
complex scientific and social issues.  
Secondly, this paper highlights that social scientists, by neglecting the skeptical 
logic, are neglecting a critical component of the social debate that is taking place.  In 
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order to fully understand the climate debate, constituents must attend to the deeper 
cultural logics that are employed by opposing sides of the issue.  Far more than science is 
at play in this issue (Hulme, 2009); climate change engages a rich portfolio of cultural 
logics, frames and issue categories that must be exposed to fully understand the social 
landscape of the debate.    
Finally, those interested in the policy implications of this paper’s findings may 
also want to draw on theories regarding dispute resolution and power to think about their 
way forward. An important aspect in which culturally based conflicts like climate change 
differ from other types of conflict most often studied by behavioral negotiation theorists 
is the extent to which they involve core values and ideological beliefs. In contrast to 
simple economic exchanges, the issues in culturally based negotiations are very closely 
associated with participants’ identity.  Individuals' positions in ideologically-based 
conflicts typically emerge from beliefs at the core of who they are – “what they believe 
about the reality of the world, how the world behaves, what fundamental rights people 
have, notions of justice, and what is right and wrong” (Wade Benzoni, Hoffman, 
Thompson, Moore, Gillespie and Bazerman, 2002: 43).  These beliefs can be deeply 
influenced by social movement politics like what is taking place in the climate change 
debate.  And the resultant politics they invoke can lead to two possible outcomes in the 
form of the debate. 
Integrative form of the dispute. Resolution of the debate over climate change 
would likely require an integrative shift (Raiffa, 1985) in the focus of the discussion 
away from positions (climate change is or is not happening) and towards the underlying 
interests and values that are at play (the validity of the scientific process, the risk related 
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to the likelihood and impact of action or inaction, the economic implications of action or 
non-action, and the myriad ideological issues around personal freedom, the proper role 
and size of government, and others).  
While this study shows that the debate is centered presently on the issues of 
science and risk, it also notes that the activation of, as yet, latent or dormant issue 
categories of religion, technology and national security and the redefinition of existing 
issue categories of science, economics, risk, and ideology may create possible “broker” 
issue categories to resolve differences. When presenting the climate change issue, it is 
critical that the frames and categories used do not threaten people’s values and therefore 
creative dismissive resistance to the argument.  Instead, the issue must be presented in a 
manner that is culturally congenial to target audiences (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995; 
Fisher and Shapiro, 2006; Kahan, Braman and Jenkins-Smith, 2010). Frames and 
categories can provide a template for the kinds of bridges that are necessary for finding 
common ground and expanding the solution space to difficult issues.  
Similarly, individuals with credibility on both sides of the debate would be 
necessary to act as “climate brokers” in this realm.  People are more likely to feel open to 
consider evidence when it is accepted or, ideally, presented by a knowledgeable member 
of their cultural community (Fisher and Shapiro, 2006; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and 
Braman, 2010). Conversely, they will dismiss information that is inconsistent with their 
cultural values when they perceive that it is being advocated by experts whose values 
they reject. Give that only 35% of Republicans believe there is solid evidence of global 
warming compared to 75% of Democrats (Pew Research Center, 2009), the most 
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effective broker would best come from the political right. At present, no one is playing 
this role.   
Finally, the timing of the engagement of such climate brokers would best follow 
in the wake of critical events.  Contextually dramatic happenings can focus sustained 
public attention and invite an opportunity for social and institutional entrepreneurs to 
direct the form of debate on critical social issues.  These events become openings for 
recasting the political landscape of social movement organizations and the resultant 
collective redefinition of social institutions and institutional logics (Hoffman and Ocasio, 
2001; Nigam and Ocasio, 2010). 
A logic schism.  While these tactics are useful in an integrative scenario, if the 
debate over climate change regresses into a fully developed logic schism, the solution 
space for resolving debate collapses and negotiations become a win-lose scenario in 
which the two sides fight a distributive battle over concessionary agreements with each 
side pursuing its goals by demonizing the other (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).  
Environmentalists are perceived as insensitively seeking environmental protection at all 
costs and willing to sacrifice economic development and human economies toward that 
end.  Economic interests are perceived as pursuing economic growth at all costs, willing 
to forfeit environmental considerations to increase profit.  With this mindset, joint 
solutions through cooperative decision-making become virtually impossible (Bazerman 
and Hoffman, 1999) and the dynamics of interaction become based on power, domination 
and coercion.  In such a scenario, interests and values are no longer the basis of 





This paper has analyzed the extent to which the logic and cultural debate around 
climate change represents a logic schism.  This is an area that social sciences can add a 
great deal to further understanding in the social and policy arena. Unfortunately, the 
contemporary presentation of academic scholarship in the climate change debate is 
largely dominated by the fields of economics, engineering and law. If social scientists 
that focus on cultural and social phenomenon want to engage as well, they must bring 
their academic tools to bear on problem domains like climate change.  It is not enough to 
say the science is decided if the skepticism counter-movement remains active and public 
uncertainty increases. Organizational researchers and social theorists have unique 
theories and methods at their disposal to explain why climate change is a polarizing issue 
in some settings and not others and why some organizations support or resist efforts to 
mitigate GHG emissions (Hoffman, 2011).  
If successful in spurring greater scholarly interest in the cultural, ideological and 
institutional elements undergirding the climate debate, research in this area – like all 
contentious social problems – will be undertaken by social science scholars using a 
variety of different theoretical approaches. Scholars who are more comfortable with 
normative research may take a critical theory stance toward climate skepticism, but 
others will approach the issue through the lenses of rational choice theory, game theory, 
organizational theory, economic sociology, etc. I remain agnostic about which of these 
approaches will be the most successful at explaining the drivers behind – and ultimately 
the outcomes of – the climate debate and believe this is best sorted out in robust academic 
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Overall Article Position 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Convinced 578 72.7% 
Skeptical 155 19.5% 
Neutral 27 3.4% 
Unclear 35 4.4% 





 Convinced Skeptical χ2 p-value 




Not Letter to 
the Editor 
71.63% 41.16% 








 Total Convinced Skeptical χ2 p-value 
Academic (non-
scientist)  3.68% 3.98% 2.58% 0.67 0.412 
Physical/Natural 
Scientist  4.64% 4.68% 4.52% 0.01 0.935 
Journalist/Editorial 
Staff  43.38% 46.37% 32.26% 9.91 0.002 
Elected Official  2.86% 3.29% 1.29% 1.75 0.186 
Civil Servant non-
elected  1.64% 2.08% 0% 3.27 0.070 
Professional 
Researcher  1.36% 1.38% 1.29% 0.01 0.929 
Citizen  28.24% 21.28% 54.19% 65.34 0.000 
Corporate Executive  2.05% 1.29% 2.58% 0.28 0.597 
Activist Representing a 
Formal Org  8.46% 10.55% 0.65% 15.50 0.000 
Educator (non-college)  1.64% 2.08% 0% 3.27 0.070 
Clergy  0.68% 0.87% 0% 1.35 0.245 
NGO Representative  0.68% 0.87% 0% 1.35 0.245 
Other  0.68% 0.69% 0.65% 0.00 0.950 







Climate Change Convinced and Skeptical Articles  
by Issue Category * 
 
 Convinced Skeptical χ2 p-value 
Science  36.85% 87.74% 126.91 0.000 
Risk 62.11% 34.19% 38.70 0.000 
Technology 9.69% 5.16% 3.14 0.076 
Economics 24.22% 21.29% 0.58 0.445 
Religion 35.12% 5.81% 51.09 0.000 
Political 
Ideology 59.00% 67.74% 3.92 0.048 
National 
Security 11.07% 1.29% 14.28 0.000 





Climate Change Convinced and Skeptical Articles 
By Frame Type * 
 
 Convinced Skeptical χ2 p-value 
Diagnostic Frame 60.38% 94.19% 63.73 0.000 
Prognostic Frame 80.45% 40.65% 96.13 0.000 
Motivational Frame 50.87% 42.58% 3.36 0.067 





Climate Change Convinced and Climate Skeptical Articles 
by Issue Category and Frame Type * 
  Diagnostic Frame Prognostic Frame Motivational Frame 
  Convinced Skeptical χ2 
p-
value Convinced Skeptical χ2 
p-
value Convinced Skeptical χ2 
p-
value 
Science  36.85% 87.74% 126.91 0.000 0% 7.74% 45.49 0.000 2.42% 12.26% 27.50 0.000 
Risk 39.97% 9.68% 50.29 0.000 37.54% 9.68% 43.87 0.000 12.63% 24.52% 13.44 0.000 
Technology 0% 0%  --  -- 9.69% 5.16% 3.14 0.076 0% 0%  --  -- 
Economics 0.87% 0.65% 0.07 0.787 5.19% 3.87% 0.46 0.500 21.28% 20.65% 0.03 0.863 
Religion 0% 0%  -- --  19.72% 5.81% 16.95 0.000 22.32% 0% 41.98 0.000 
Political 
Ideology 23.53% 58.06% 68.35 0.000 45.85% 22.58% 27.37 0.000 5.02% 0.65% 5.95 0.015 
National 
Security 3.81% 0% 6.08 0.014 1.90% 0.65% 1.20 0.273 6.75% 0.65% 8.82 0.003 
 





A Stylized Distribution of American Public Positions on Climate Change 
 
Appendix 1 
Newspaper Op/Ed Coding Scheme 
 
      
0. Science 









Says the consensus process by which 
IPCC concludes that climate change is 
happening is appropriate/rigorous 
201 
Says the IPCC process for 
determining the scientific evidence 
around climate change is flawed 
Stresses certainty of climate evidence. 
Cites climate change as a certain fact 
(i.e. “it is happening”) 
Stresses uncertainty of climate 
evidence/climate models 
Denies climate evidence entirely (cc a 
myth, hoax). 
Cites support for global cooling 
Skeptics have the science wrong 
Believers have the science wrong 
Consensus exists 
Consensus doesn't exist 
2 
CAUSES of climate 
change 
Diagnostic 102 
Climate change is caused by humans 
(e.g. by combusting fossil fuels, 
consumption, etc) 
202 
Climate change is not caused by 





No more research is needed 
203 






Scientists calling for action are neutral 
experts 
204 
Scientists calling for action are 
ideologically motivated/using 
evidence selectively  
Scientists have strong professional 
norms that stress neutrality and 
objectivity 
Scientists are economically motivated  
in their results (e.g. working to get 
more grant money) 
      
1. Risk 
        







Argues for the Precautionary 
Principle; it is better to be safe than 
sorry 
205 
Argues that we have time to wait for 
more scientific clarity before actions 
are needed 
Regardless of evidence for or against 
cc, it is prudent to take action (we 
should do something) 
Since there are questions about the 
evidence on climate change, the risk 
isn't great enough to act 
What does it hurt to act? No need to act now.  
We need to act now! Action needed 
now to solve this urgent problem. 
No need to act now.  
6 PHYSICAL RISKS 
Diagnostic 106 
Physical risks are/will be real and 
present  (e.g. hurricanes, droughts, 
melting ice, species extinction, 
biodiversity loss)  
306 
Physical risks are exaggerated, hyped 
and overplayed, or only apply to 





Health or social risks are/will be real 
and present  (e.g. disease, public 
health disasters) 
207 
Health risks are exaggerated, hyped 
and overplayed, or only apply to 
others (i.e. developed countries) 
8 EXTERNALITIES 
Motivational 108 
Addressing climate change will cause 
positive  social externalities (e.g. 
public health benefits) 
208 
Addressing climate change will cause 
negative externalities (e.g. poorer 
quality of life) 
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Addressing climate change will help 
us avoid terrible consequences from 
social or physical risks listed above 
(we must act) 
Addressing climate change will not 
affect our ability to deal with social or 
physical risks 
Addressing climate change will cause 
positive environmental externalities 
(cleaner air, better enviornment, etc.) 
Not addressing climate change will 
cause positive externalities (longer 
growing seasons, milder winters, 
better quality of life)  
      
2. Technology 
        
Low   High 
9 




Questions Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration (CCS) technology 
feasibility or timetable to being 
operational 
209 
Advocates for carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) as a technological 
solution 
Questions geo-engineering technology 
feasibility or timetable to being 
operational 
Advocates for geo-engineering as a 
technological solution 
Questions safety and feasibility of 
nuclear power 
Champions tech-ready nuclear power 
as a technological soulution 
Champions renewables over other 
energy options to combat climate 
change 
Dismisses renewables as a viable 
energy solution compared to other 
options (e.g. nuclear, coal, etc) 
Champions a fuel mix but favors 
renewables  
Champions a fuel mix but favors 
nuclear 
      
3. Economics 
        
Long-term   Short-term 
10 COST-BENEFIT 
Diagnostic 110 
Highlights the methodological limits 
of cost-benefit analysis (e.g. cb is not 
able to capture all costs and benefits 
such as aesthetic value, well-being, 
externalities) 
210 
Says cost-benefit analysis adequately 
accounts for relevant economic 
variables and social/environ 
externalities when evaluating cc 
policy options 
Argues commensuration of natural 
resources is wrong (i.e. aesthetic value 
cannot be translated to monetary 
value) 
Supports commensuration of natural 
resources (It's ok to monetize natural 
resources) - only code this if they're 
talking about using the earth's 
physical  resources,  NOT 
CARBON (so this code does not 







Long-term economic benefits of 
addressing cc will outweigh short-
terms costs 
211 
Long-term costs of addressing cc will 
outweigh long-term benefits 
Economic cost of NOT addressing 
climate change will be high 
Economic costs of NOT addressing 
climate change will NOT be high 
Argues for the win-win scenario. 
Short term benefits outweigh costs. 
GHG controls will help the economy 
(local or national, more GREEN 
JOBS, make US more competitive) 
Argues for the lose-lose scenario. 
Short-term costs outweigh the 
benefits. GHG controls will cause 
economic harm to the economy (local 






Investing in renewable energy is 
PROFITABLE/GOOD FOR 
ECONOMY  now or in the near 
future.   
212 
Investing in renewable energy is not 
profitable or feasible now and will not 
be  in the future 
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Investing in nuclear, coal, or geo-eng 
is not profitable now or in the future 
Investing in nuclear, coal, or geo-eng 
is profitable or feasible now and will 
be  in the future 
13 
DISCOUNTING 
the  Future 
Motivational 113 
Says it is wrong to apply any (or a 
high) discount rate to future 
generations 
213 
Places higher discount rates on future 
generations (e.g. future generations 
will be wealthier, people today do not 
value people tomorrow as much) 
      
4. Religion/Values 
        





Climate change evidence, supported 
by scientific reason, is not at odds 
with religion 214 
Scientific reason is hostile to religious 
faith (e.g. as evidenced by past clashes 
over intelligent design) 
15 
FREE WILL and 
religion 
Prognostic 115 
Humans have FREE WILL to solve 
climate change so they should act. 
215 
Places responsibility for care of the 
Earth in God's hands (i.e. humans are 
weak and cannot know God's will)  
16 EDUCATION 
Prognostic 116 
Education is needed to 
teach/inform/inspire people to address 
climate change. 
216 
Educational time and resources should 





Individuals must take civic action (e.g. 
contacting legislators, protesting) 217 





Argues limits on consumption and 
lifestyle choices are needed to address 
cc (smaller houses, greening homes, 
more commuting, less consumption) 218 
Argues that individuals should not 
have limitations placed on their 
consumption or lifestyle choices 
19 
Climate Change is a 
MORAL issue 
Motivational 119 
Addressing climate change is a moral 
responsibility (e.g. stresses human 
rights, human welfare, ANIMAL 
rights, justice and others) 
219 
Climate change is not a moral issue.  
It is a political issue. Addressing cc 
means having to take progressive (i.e. 
immoral) stances on other social 
issues (e.g. contraception, GLBT, 
women's rights 
Stresses Intergenerational Equity. 
Stresses responsibility to all future 
generations  
Stresses more responsibliity to today's 
people and issues. Emphasizes End of 
Times or the Rapture 
Ecocentrism. Argues for Human 
Stewardship of the Earth.  
Anthropocentrism: Argues for Human 
Dominion over Earth 
      
5. Political Ideology 
        





Climate proponents are squelched 
(e.g. in Bush Administration)  220 
Climate skeptics are 
squelched/freedom of speech should 
be honored 
21 MEDIA Bias 
Diagnostic 121 
Shows a conservative/too balanced 
bias on cc 
221 




Diagnostic  122 
Blames climate opponents for playing 
politics with climate change. 
222 
Blames climate supporters for playing 
politics with climate change.  
Big business puts forth climate 
denying and/or benefits from it 
Environmentalists/liberals/Al 
Gore/United Nations put forth climate 
hysteria and/or benefit from it  
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Republicans benefit from climate 
denying.  










Highlights the limitations of 
capitalism and free trade for 
addressing cc (market alone cannot 
solve cc) 
Champions capitalism and free trade 
(market will solve cc) 
Supportive of government 
intervention in the market to regulate 
GHGs (e.g. carbon tax, cap and trade, 
stricter state laws or CAFÉ standards) 
- LEGISLATION IS GOOD 
Against gov't intervention in the 
market to regulate GHG emissions 
(opposes big gov't, gov't "programs," 
gov't running our lives) SMALL 
GOV'T better 
Regulation will create incentives that 
will positively change individual and 
org behavior. 
Regulation will negatively change 
individual and org behavior.  
Regulation will fix distortions in the 
market.  
Regulation will cause distortions in 
the market.  
 Regulation/incentives needed to spur 
new markets, promote clean tech, give 
renewables a leg up. 
If renewables are competitive, they 
should be abe to make it on their own 




Embraces multi-lateral approaches to 
addressing cc (e.g. Kyoto and 
Copenhagen).  
224 
Champions national sovereignty (we 
should not do it at all, should not be 
pressured by the EU).  
Stresses need for U.S. (by itself) to be 
a climate leader (we should go first).  
Expresses concern that U.S. climate 
leadership will give unfair advantage 
to developing countries (China and 
India). U.S. shouldn't act until they 
do. 
Stresses need for developed countries 
(including U.S.) to take the lead on 
climate. 
Stresses need for developing countries 
to make binding GHG reduction 
commitments 
Bipartisanship (or collaboration more 
broadly) is necessary to solve this.  
This is an issue that matters to 
everyone 
Republicans should continue to 
oppose climate change legislation or 





Developed countries are at fault for 
historical emissions 
225 
China and India are at fault for present 
day emission levels. Expresses 
concern that developing countries 
aren't going to do enough to address 
cc even if developed countries act. 
      
6. National Security 
        





Climate change will cause increase in 
environmental refuges or immigration 
to developed countries 
226 
The United States will not be affected 
by environmental refuges b/c of 
distance from affected areas, 
immigration laws, or other regulations 
meant to limit immigration 
Climate change will cause instability 
in developing countries 
Climate change will not cause 
instability in developing countries 
27 MILITARY Strain 
Diagnostic 127 
U.S. military intervention in 
developing countries (or 
domestically…e.g. Katrina) will be 
necessary when climate change causes 
unrest (could stretch US military too 
thin, cost too much) 
227 
The United States will not have to 




28 OIL Independence 
Prognostic 128 
U.S. SHOULD wean itself off foreign 
oil using domestic renewables  
228 
U.S. should use its own fossil (coal, 
natural gas, etc.) and bio-fuels 








Climate change is a national security 
issue so we should act 
229 
Climate change is not a national 
security issue so we don't need to act. 
Addressing climate change will enable 
US to get off foreign oil (note 
difference from code 132) 
Addressing climate change will not 
change the fact that we will need to 
import oil 
Addressing climate change will help 
U.S. avoid relying on extremist 
foreign regimes 
Addressing climate change will help 
U.S. avoid national security threats 
(e.g. in our interest to avoid unstable 
regimes developing) 
Addressing climate change will not 
help the U.S. avoid national security 




1 The author subscribes to this view, supported by most scientific institutions around the world, most 
recently the National Research Council (2010). 
2 For the remainder of this paper, I will use the term “denier” rather than skeptic to describe the active 
social movement members as it best describes a category of constituents who do not believe that climate 
change is happening, as opposed to just being doubtful. 
3 In line with drop in public opinion over this period recorded by the Pew Research Center (2009), 75 
percent of articles were climate positive in 2007 and 2008 compared to 18 percent skeptical (the remaining 
articles being neutral or unclear), by 2009 the number of convinced articles drops to 66 percent and the 
skeptical articles increase to 23 percent. 
4 Before proceeding, I would be remiss if I did not mention that there has been intense debate on both sides 
of the climate issue over whether the media presents climate change in a biased manner. Convinced 
advocates argue that the media has contributed to fostering skepticism among the public by presenting both 
the convinced and skeptical views, because they argue the climate denier view is a very marginal scientific 
view. Climate deniers, on the other hand, accuse media outlets of not giving their views enough exposure. 
While an interesting topic for inquiry, questions about media bias do not drive this paper. Rather, it views 
newspaper data as a convenient way to see expressed climate views by the public. 
5 Beyond the National Academies, scientific consensus is based on the affirmations of climate change by 
the following scientific bodies: NASA's Goddard Institute of Space Studies, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, US Environmental Protection 
Agency, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, American Institute of Physics, 
National Center for Atmospheric Research, State of the Canadian Cryosphere, Canadian Meteorological 
and Oceanographic Society, Academia Brasiliera de Ciências Brazil, Academié des Sciences France, 
Accademia dei Lincei Italy, The Royal Society of the UK, Royal Society of Canada, Deutsche Akademie 
der Naturforscher Leopoldina Germany, and the Science Council of Japan.  
 
